The key distinction in the current Ghana gold-trading controversy is who legally and financially bore the trading loss versus who facilitated the transaction.
BoG or GoldBod?
Based on the IMF assessment and the institutions’ own financial disclosures, the stronger case is that the Bank of Ghana (BoG) incurred the major trading losses, while GoldBod acted primarily as the purchasing/aggregation agent and earned fees for services.
The IMF reported that the BoG’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) generated losses of more than US$1.7 billion in 2025, equivalent to roughly 1.5% of GDP. The losses were associated primarily with Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) doré purchases and included valuation effects, discounts and transaction-related costs.
GoldBod CEO Sammy Gyamfi has made the distinction even more explicitly: GoldBod purchased and aggregated gold for the BoG but did not sell the gold, negotiate the off-take agreements or determine the selling prices. He says GoldBod accounted for about GH¢133 billion advanced to it for purchases in 2025.
Where did GoldBod’s money come in?
GoldBod was compensated for services. According to the analysis published today, its 2025 assay fees were about GH¢337.4 million. The analysis therefore treats these fees as an expense incurred by the BoG rather than as evidence that GoldBod itself suffered the trading loss.
This is important because a transaction can generate a loss for one party while generating revenue for another.
A simplified structure was:
BoG financing → GoldBod purchases/aggregates gold → BoG takes the gold → BoG sells to off-takers → BoG receives FX
Therefore, the fact that GoldBod participated in the transaction does not automatically mean the subsequent trading loss belongs to GoldBod.
But there is an important complication
Calling the entire US$1.7 billion simply a “GoldBod loss” would be misleading. But it is also too simplistic to describe the entire amount as an ordinary commercial trading loss.
The IMF’s analysis includes valuation effects, particularly the exchange-rate difference between the rate used when gold was purchased and the rate used by BoG for accounting. GoldBod argues that this means a substantial portion reflects the cost of a policy intervention designed to mobilise FX and stabilise the cedi, rather than straightforward operational mismanagement.
The BoG itself had previously acknowledged losses under DGPP/G4R: its January 2026 response reported cumulative losses exceeding GH¢7 billion for 2022–2024.
So who should be held accountable?
There are actually three separate questions:
| Question | More appropriate institution |
|---|---|
| Who recorded the DGPP/G4R trading loss? | BoG |
| Who performed gold purchasing/aggregation services? | GoldBod |
| Who should answer for the policy decision that created the exposure? | BoG / monetary-policy authorities |
GoldBod’s own 2025 accounts are also relevant: it says it recorded an operational surplus of about GH¢907 million and overall profit exceeding GH¢5.4 billion, contradicting claims that the US$1.7 billion IMF figure was a GoldBod loss.
There is also a major timeline issue: GoldBod stopped acting as a BoG buying agent in March 2026 and moved to self-funded gold aggregation.
Bottom line
The “incidence” of the 2025 gold-trading losses falls principally on the Bank of Ghana, not GoldBod. GoldBod was an important operational intermediary, but the financial risk from the subsequent sale of the gold and the associated FX/valuation effects sat with the BoG.
The more interesting economic question is therefore not simply “Did GoldBod lose US$1.7 billion?” It is:
Was the BoG’s loss an unacceptable trading loss, or an intentional policy cost incurred to obtain FX, build reserves, formalise ASM gold and stabilise the cedi?
That distinction matters enormously. GoldBod’s argument is that the macroeconomic benefits should be measured against the BoG’s policy costs, while the parliamentary opposition is demanding that the costs and GoldBod’s role be subjected to much greater scrutiny.
If you are assessing the issue from an investor/mining-industry perspective, the most useful next step is to break the US$1.7 billion into actual cash trading losses, FX valuation losses, off-taker discounts, GoldBod fees and BoG funding costs—because those categories have very different implications for Ghana’s gold sector.
